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wenty-first century juvenile justice jurisprudence
has focused on the criminal responsibility of ado-
lescents, including, notably, the interface between
psychological and neurological development and social
accountability. The focus has led to a growing aware-
ness that teenagers should not be equated with or held
as accountable as adults. For example, several states,
including Connecticut, Illinois, and Mississippi, have
raised the age of criminal responsibility from 16 or 17
to 18, with a corresponding expansion of juvenile court
jurisdiction. Of potentially greater significance, the prin-
ciple of diminished criminal responsibility has gained
credibility. Witness, for example, the US Supreme Court
holding that capital punishment cannot be imposed on
persons under the age of 18 (Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005)), while life without the possibility of parole
cannot be imposed when a juvenile has been convicted
of a nonhomicide offense (Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct.
(2010).) Simultaneously, several states have statutorily
restricted the transfer of cases from the juvenile courts
to the adult criminal court, partially reversing the late
twentieth century "get tough" approach.
Overlooked has been the younger or preteen child. Most
American states do not maintain a minimum age limitation
for juvenile delinquency jurisdiction. Thirty-five states lack
any statutory provision, permitting at least the theoretical
prosecution of an infant. The remaining 15 have enacted
statutes establishing minmum ages ranging from six to 10.
The vast majority of American children under the age of
12 may be charged with criminal activity. The vast major-
ity may consequently be subject to detention, confinement
in residential institutions, and the adverse collateral conse-
quences of a delinquency finding.
In 2008 (the most recent year of available relevant
statistics), 40,748 American children under the age of
12 were referred to court for prosecution as juvenile de-
linquents (Nat'l Ctr. for Juvenile Justice, Easy Access
to Juvenile Court Statistics: 1985-2008, OJJDP (2011),
www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezajcs/.) Of those, 7,752 were
adjudicated as delinquent. Local court statistics confirm
the national pattern. In 2010, 100 alleged offenders aged
eight or nine were referred to the Maricopa County Ju-
venile Court in Phoenix. (See H. Ted Rubin, Increases
in the Maximum Age of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 17
Juv. JUST. UPDATE 4, 14 (2011).) In Memphis, Tennes-
see, 113 children 10 and younger, including eight chil-
dren aged five and six, were referred to court in 2009.
(Id.) Although prosecution of the very young is not a
recent development, the phenomenon may have been fu-
elled in recent years by the "get tough" on juvenile crime
approach and the prevalence of "zero tolerance" poli-
cies by public schools (a 2001 ABA resolution condemns
"zero tolerance" policies). Given the low age cohort, it
is not surprising that, as the OJJDP statistics indicate,
most cases are diverted, withdrawn, or dismissed. How-
ever, even children who have not been formally adjudi-
cated suffer the deleterious repercussions of arrest, po-
lice questioning, possible detention, and the intimidating
nature of judicial proceedings. And the almost 8,000
who are found to be delinquent annually confront the
possibility or the reality of incarceration or the curtail-
ment of their freedom through probationary conditions
and governmental supervision.
At the international level, most countries have established
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eligible for a period that begins once their sentence is com-
plete. The exclusionary period ranges from a minimum of
three years to a maximum of six, with a few bans extending
indefinitely. Adjudicating juveniles as adults subjects en-
tire families to the same restrictions placed on offenders.
This puts many families in the difficult position of having
to choose among losing public housing, living apart from
their children, or committing a crime themselves by omit-
ting their children from the application. For the families
there is no good choice, and for the children, this can vastly
increase the chance of recidivism.
Effects on immigration
Adjudicating a juvenile as an adult can have catastrophic
effects on immigrants and their families. People consid-
ered an adult for criminal purposes are also considered
an adult for immigration and deportation purposes. (See
NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES § 2:7
(2011), available at Westlaw IMLC § 2:7.) Once convicted
of a qualifying offense (see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a), 1182(a)),
a resident noncitizen is subject to deportation at the dis-
covery and discretion of an Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) officer. Sometimes an individual will be
deported upon the completion of a prison sentence, and,
other times, an individual will be deported years later when
an officer notices the prior conviction and decides to initi-
ate proceedings. If someone who incurred an adult criminal
conviction while a juvenile decides to apply for citizenship,
even years after the offense, immigration authorities will
have cause to scrutinize the individual's background. Upon
discovery of a qualifying conviction, the individual may
end up back in custody facing crushing consequences of an
act committed long ago.
Conclusion
Studies have shown that two-thirds of children who com-
mit crimes as minors do not reoffend later in life. (See
Merril Sobie, Pity the Child: The Age of Delinquency in
New York, 30 PACE L. REV. 1061, 1089 (2010).) Those
that do reoffend as adults will be subjected to the same
collateral consequences as all other adult offenders, and
the public has the previously mentioned mechanisms in
place as safeguards against such repeat offenders. Those
that do not reoffend do not deserve the same lifetime
criminalization. As such, a system that automatically
adjudicates children as adults is counterproductive. Sad-
dling juveniles with an adult criminal record impedes
personal efforts at reform and creates long-term societal
expense. Children need room to reform, and a system
that imposes adult convictions on juveniles only when
necessary, and for only the most severe crimes, would be
far less damaging than the practice of allowing the ex-
ception to craft the rule. After all, does anyone want to
be judged by who they were at 14?
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minimum jurisdictional ages. (Jhe UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child requires that member states enact an
unspecified age threshold.) In the developed world, the mini-
mum age ranges from 10-for example, in Great Britain and
Switzerland-to 15 in countries such as Norway and Finland.
Fourteen is not uncommon, as in Germany, Italy, and Russia.
Historically, the lack of a minimum age in the United States
dates from the establishment of the juvenile courts in the early
twentieth century. In the prejuvenile court era, the common
law infancy defense was applicable, precluding the prosecution
of children below the age of seven. Further, children above age
seven but below age 14 were presumed to lack the capacity to
discern the distinction between good and evil and hence the
criminal intent necessary to sustain a conviction. Sir William
Blackstone, the preeminent eighteenth century common law
authority, commented that the presumption could be rebutted
only by evidence proving that the child possessed the requisite
capacity "beyond all doubt and contradiction," a burden of
proof substantially greater than the customary criminal stan-
dard of "beyond a reasonable doubt." Blackstone continued
by observing that, although not unknown, the conviction of
a child below age 14 was a rare event. The infancy defense ef-
fectively insulated almost all children for acts committed when
they were less than 14 years of age.
The twentieth century watershed creation of the ju-
venile courts spelled the demise of the infancy defense.
The issue of whether the infancy defense had any
role to play in juvenile proceedings arose fairly
quickly, and the decisions have almost uniformly
resolved against recognition of the infancy defense
in juvenile proceedings. Most of the decisions rest
on the premise that the rehabilitative ideal and pa-
rens patriae doctrine upon which the juvenile court
was founded are based, first and foremost, on the
notion that the child is being helped, not punished.
(Andrew M. Carter, Age Matters: The Casefor a Constitution-
alized Infancy Defense, 54 KA. L. RiEv. 687, 721 (2006).)
That view has largely persisted, see, e.g, In re Tyvonne
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M, 558 A.2d 661 (Conn. 1989), although in recent decades
a handful of state courts have resurrected the defense. The
California Supreme Court, for example, has held that the
Delinquency Code "should apply only to those who are
over 14 and may be presumed to understand the wrong-
fulness of their acts and to those under the age of 14 who
clearly appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct." (In re
Gladys R., 464 P2d 127 (Cal. 1970).) (Whether the proof
need be "beyond all doubt and contradiction" is another
matter.) In most states, however, every child is subject to
prosecution, regardless of age.
Maintaining a system that is essentially "age blind"
raises, or at least should raise, several legal issues. One is
competency, generally defined as the ability to understand
the proceedings and materially assist in one's defense. How
many six-year-olds or, for that matter, 10-year-olds under-
stand judicial proceedings and possess the ability to fully
assist counsel? Second, the principle of specific intent or
mens rea is deeply ingrained in criminal law jurisprudence.
How many children below the age of 12 (or perhaps 14)
possess the mens rea we require when the offender is older?
Another issue is diminished responsibility. We increasingly
apply the principle when adjudicating a 15-year-old as op-
posed to a 20-year-old, but have yet to develop diminished
responsibility standards when adjudicating an eight-year-
old as opposed to a 15-year-old. (An eight-year-old, like
his or her older brethren, is usually subjected to the full
restrictive panoply of juvenile delinquency dispositions.)
And just what purpose is served? Does anyone believe that
prosecuting a seven-year-old deters other seven-year-olds
from committing similar acts, or that society needs protec-
tion against seven-year-old predators? An analysis of these
principles is beyond the scope of this short article. Suffice
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quences if the police fail to ensure that sound identification
procedures are used. Following the New Jersey Henderson
model, judges can evaluate identifications in pretrial hear-
ings, consider excluding the evidence or part of it, and,
when admitting it at trial, they should provide jurors with
careful instructions on the relevant factors affecting the ac-
curacy of eyewitness memory.
Conclusio
Each of the types of evidence discussed-jailhouse in-
formant testimony, confession testimony, and eyewit-
ness testimony-share a common problem. The jury may
hear confident witnesses describing seemingly powerful
evidence, but they cannot tell how police and prosecu-
to say that the American legal system has given scant atten-
tion to the underlying purposes and principles of the penal
law as applied to the very young offender.
Establishing a minimum age for delinquency prosecu-
tion would not necessarily evade the problem of dealing
with the occasional violent or lawless acts committed by
young children. Countries that follow the norm of plac-
ing an age floor under the prosecution of children treat the
complained of incident as a child welfare matter instead
of a juvenile justice issue. An assault or theft committed
by a 10-year-old may raise child protective issues or may
prove the need for family counseling and therapy (although
minor criminal acts by the very young may be just part of
growing up). Services appropriate for that age group are
within the domain of social service systems rather than the
juvenile justice system. Referring the child for juvenile de-
linquency prosecution, as happens to approximately 40,000
children each year, is manifestly unfair and counterproduc-
tive, like swatting a fly with a sledge hammer.
The ABA Juvenile Justice Standards recommend a
minimum age of 10, quite an improvement over the cur-
rent practice of no minimum age (1 JUVENILE JUSTICE STAN-
DARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
AND SANCTIONS, Standard 2.1, (1980).) Other experts
have advocated a floor of age 12, see Rubin, supra, which
would place the United States firmly within the interna-
tional consensus. Regardless of the specific age threshold,
the time is long past to abolish the century old prosecu-
tion of toddlers who, regardless of their individual apti-
tudes, cannot possibly fully understand the consequences
of their acts, cannot adequately defend themselves (even
with counsel), and cannot possibly benefit from restrictive
dispositions tailored to the older adolescents. m
tors may have shaped the testimony, even inadvertently.
Errors can be introduced early on in the criminal process,
and detecting them later is incredibly difficult. Once an
informant statement is contaminated, once facts are dis-
closed in the interrogation room, or once a suggestion is
made to an eyewitness, the opportunity to learn the truth
may be lost. These innocent people were the lucky ones
in one way, despite the ordeals they suffered, since DNA
tests could later be done to free them. That is not true of
the vast majority of criminal convictions, which do not
involve usable DNA evidence. While these wrongful con-
victions are the tip of a much larger iceberg, we can learn
from patterns of error in these trials to make our criminal
justice system more accurate.,0
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